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A Correction and Re-Examination of “Stationary Concepts
for Experimental 2× 2 Games”
By Christoph Brunner, Colin F. Camerer, and Jacob K. Goeree ∗
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported
laboratory results for completely mixed 2 × 2 games used to compare
Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response
equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium,
and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct
some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other
concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of
other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss
aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other
non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform
impulse balance equilibrium.
JEL: C70, C91
Keywords: stationary concepts, quantal response, action-sampling,
payoff-sampling, impulse balance
A recent paper by Selten and Chmura (2008) (henceforth SC) reports laboratory results
for 12 different 2×2 games with a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. These binary-choice
games are relatively simple and provide a natural testbed for alternative models that aim
to predict long-run, or stationary, outcomes of play. SC consider five such models: Nash
equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling
equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium subsumes two different restrictions: that players have correct beliefs
about others’ play and that players best respond to those beliefs. Quantal response
equilibrium (QRE) replaces the requirement of best responses with “better responses,”
i.e., players are more likely to choose the option with the higher expected payoff but
they do not necessarily choose the best option all the time. QRE does assume that
players’ beliefs are correct on average, i.e., beliefs are not systematically biased. Action
sampling equilibrium describes the long-run outcome when players best respond to a finite
sample of their opponent’s previous actions.1 Payoff sampling equilibrium describes the
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1SC (p. 939) write “The concept has been developed by one of the authors (Selten). As far as we know,
it cannot be found in the literature.” However, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt (2002) introduced
the concept of “stochastic learning equilibrium,” which describes the long-run outcome when players
better respond to a weighted sample of their opponent’s previous actions. In other words, the models
are similar because one uses a finite sample (bounded memory) and another uses a discounted sample
(fading memory), though neither model is nested within the other, and stochastic learning equilibrium
allows for both best and better responses. The stochastic learning equilibrium is also clearly a stationary
1
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long-run outcome when players form two finite samples of their past payoffs, one for
each option, and select the one with the highest total payoff. Finally, impulse balance
equilibrium is based on the idea that players take into account foregone payoffs. If
the option not chosen would have yielded higher payoffs, then there is an “impulse”
to change (and, importantly, ‘losses’ of foregone payoff are weighted twice as heavily as
gains). Impulse balance equilibrium corresponds to the long run outcome where, for both
players, expected impulses are equal across the two options.
SC conclude that Nash and QRE fit worse than the other three concepts. They write:
It is remarkable that the newer concepts of impulse balance equilibrium, pay-
off sampling equilibrium, and action-sampling equilibrium clearly outperform
the more established concepts of quantal response equilibrium [QRE] and
Nash equilibrium. All the relevant comparisons are highly significant. This is
perhaps the most important result of the statistical tests. (p. 962)
The first point of this comment is that the model fits for two of the five concepts —
QRE and action-sampling — are incorrect for all 12 games.2 We report the correct results
for these two models (and some other small corrections). The corrected fits for QRE are
close to the other three non-Nash concepts, which weakens the most novel part of their
original conclusion, i.e., “all the relevant comparisons are highly significant,” and implies
a weaker conclusion: the sampling theories do better in some (but not all) comparisons,
and QRE does not fit worse (or better) than impulse balance equilibrium.3
Fit measures and statistical tests show that the four non-Nash models are about equally
accurate. SC note this fact (but for three models, not all four) and suggest a research
direction as follows:
It is not easy to understand why the predictions of the three newer concepts
are not very far apart, in spite of the fact that they are based on very different
principles. This is perhaps peculiar to our sample. It would be desirable
to devise experiments that permit a better discrimination among the three
concepts. (p. 965, emphasis ours).
The second point of the comment is to extend the scope of their comparative analysis, by
showing how two different games reported several years ago do “permit a better discrimi-
nation” among some of the concepts. The first game was explicitly designed to show that
no quantal response equilibrium (logit or otherwise) could explain observed behavior (see
Game 4 and Proposition 1 in Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey,
2003). Applying impulse balance equilibrium to this game works like ‘magic:’ it explains
observed behavior almost perfectly. So this game is capable of differentiating between
two of the concepts – impulse balance equilibrium and risk-neutral QRE – that fit equally
well in SC’s data.4
The results also highlight one of the crucial assumptions underlying impulse balance
equilibrium: impulses are defined relative to a security level (the max-min payoff) and
concept, not a model of learning, intended to describe long-run outcomes.
2A referee also asked us to correct a typo on page 945 of the SC paper in paragraph 4; ”row R”
should be ”column R”.
3It is true that with the corrected analysis, Nash predictions do fit worse than the other four concepts.
However, the ability of other models to explain deviations from Nash play has been shown in hundreds
of previous experiments, see Colin F. Camerer (2003) for a book-length summary. This part of their
conclusion is solid but is only original in its emphasis on the sampling and impulse balance models.
4Indeed, impulse balance equilibrium (with loss aversion) outperforms all other stationary concepts
(without loss aversion). Once the other stationary concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they
perform better than impulse balance equilibrium (see Figure 6 below).
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it is assumed that losses with respect to this security level are weighed twice as much as
gains. While impulse balance equilibrium is ostensibly a parameter-free concept (since the
loss aversion coefficient is fixed to 2), this additional assumption about players’ different
reactions to foregone losses and gains is not innocuous. For the game designed by Goeree,
Holt and Palfrey (2003), it is the assumption of loss aversion that makes impulse balance
equilibrium predict well.5 As we show below, if the other concepts are augmented with
loss aversion they predict behavior quite well (and even better than impulse balance
equilibrium).
The second class of games that discriminate among concepts are asymmetric 2 × 2
matching pennies games (e.g., Jack Ochs, 1995). We report new analyses using the data
of Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey and Roberto A. Weber (2000). In these
games, loss aversion plays no role since security levels are zero and payoffs are positive.
We find that impulse balance equilibrium fits the same as QRE and somewhat worse
than action-sampling and payoff-sampling. These two re-analyses of older data take up
the search for games that discriminate better among stationary concepts that SC called
for, and show that the loss-aversion built into impulse balance equilibrium accounts for
some of that concept’s success.
I. Re-Examining the SC Results
Table 1 shows data averages and model predictions for each of the 12 games. This
table, and all subsequent tables and figures report corrections of their results in a visual
form identical to their originals. The bold numbers indicate discrepancies between our
results and those of SC. In particular, we find (i) a different impulse balance prediction
for Game 1, (ii) a different data average for Game 3, (iii) a different optimal sample size
(n = 12) and, hence, different predictions for action-sampling equilibrium (see Figure 1
for the mean-squared distances by sample size), and (iv) vastly different predictions for
the QRE model: the precision parameter we estimate using the mean-squared distance
objective function is λ = 1.05, much lower than the estimate reported by SC (λ = 8.84).6
At this lower value of λ, the QRE predictions (Table 1) are much different from Nash
predictions and much closer to the data. The improved fit is illustrated by Figure 2,
which shows data averages and model predictions and parallels Figure 8 in SC. Using an
‘ocular metric’ suggests the predictions of the alternative models are remarkably close
to each other and to the data averages. To quantify this we also computed the sample
variance and theory-specific variance as in SC, which are shown in Figure 3 (cf. Figure
12 in SC).
SC evaluate the stationary concepts using data from the first 100 periods and final
100 periods (as in their Figure 13). Our correction to their Figure 13 is Figure 4, which
displays theory-specific variances for the different concepts (excluding Nash) by the first
and last blocks of 100 periods and for all 200 periods (correcting their Figure 12). It is
notable that all models fit substantially better in the last block than in the first block, as
one would hope for reasonable concepts of stationary behavior (which are not necessarily
designed to explain early behavior). It is also the case that impulse balance equilibrium
is the best model in the first block of 100 periods, the worst in the second block of 100
5Following Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten (2005), we estimated a one-parameter extension of
impulse balance equilibrium where the weight for gains is fixed to be 1 but the weight for losses is a free
parameter, γ. The estimations yield γ = 2.07 and the improvement in log-likelihood when γ is fixed at
2 is only 0.6%. In other words, the degree of loss aversion (γ = 2) that is hardwired into the impulse
balance equilibrium concept is nearly optimal for the data set considered.
6Using maximum-likelihood techniques yields an estimate λ = 0.99.
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periods, and is best using all periods.7 It is an interesting question how model accuracy in
early, late, and all periods should be used to judge how well a stationary concept explains
behavior.
Table 1—Five Stationary Concepts Together with the Observed Relative Frequencies for
Each of the Experimental Games.
    Nash 
QRE 
(=1.05)
Action-
sampling 
(n=12) 
Payoff-
sampling 
(n=6) 
Impulse 
Balance 
Observed 
average of 12 
observations 
Game 1 U 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.071 0.068 0.079
 L 0.909 0.637 0.705 0.643 0.580 0.690
Game 2 U 0.182 0.154 0.193 0.185 0.172 0.217
 L 0.727 0.579 0.584 0.569 0.491 0.527
Game 3 U 0.273 0.168 0.208 0.152 0.161 0.163
 L 0.909 0.770 0.774 0.771 0.765 0.793
Game 4 U 0.364 0.275 0.302 0.285 0.259 0.286
 L 0.818 0.734 0.719 0.726 0.710 0.736
Game 5 U 0.364 0.307 0.329 0.307 0.297 0.327
 L 0.727 0.657 0.643 0.654 0.628 0.664
Game 6 U 0.455 0.417 0.426 0.427 0.400 0.445
 L 0.636 0.607 0.596 0.597 0.600 0.596
    Nash 
QRE 
(=1.05)
Action-
sampling 
(n=12) 
Payoff-
sampling 
(n=6) 
Impulse 
Balance 
Observed 
average of 6 
observations 
Game 7 U 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.060 0.104 0.141
 L 0.909 0.637 0.705 0.691 0.634 0.564
Game 8 U 0.182 0.154 0.193 0.222 0.258 0.250
 L 0.727 0.579 0.584 0.602 0.561 0.587
Game 9 U 0.273 0.168 0.208 0.154 0.188 0.254
 L 0.909 0.770 0.774 0.767 0.764 0.827
Game 10 U 0.364 0.275 0.302 0.308 0.304 0.366
 L 0.818 0.734 0.719 0.730 0.724 0.700
Game 11 U 0.364 0.307 0.329 0.338 0.354 0.331
 L 0.727 0.657 0.643 0.650 0.646 0.652
Game 12 U 0.455 0.417 0.426 0.404 0.466 0.439
 L 0.636 0.607 0.596 0.599 0.604 0.604
 
Note:  is the logit precision parameter, n the optimal sampling size for action or payoff sampling 
7This conclusion is different from what is concluded from SC’s Figure 13, because of the corrections
to both QRE and action-sampling, which improve their fit especially in the last block of 100 periods.
VOL. VOLUME NO. ISSUE STATIONARY CONCEPTS 5
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
.
08
.
09
.
1
Q
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Sampling variance S Theory specific component T
Figure 1. Overall Mean Squared Distances for the Action-Sampling Equilibria with Different
Sample Sizes (cf. SC Figure 9).
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Figure 2. Visualization of the Theoretical Equilibria and the Observed Average in the Con-
stant Sum Games (cf. SC Figure 8).
6 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
To test for significant differences, SC report ten pairwise comparisons of the five differ-
ent models based on the matched-pairs signed-rank test. Each model generates a squared
deviation (between observed and predicted frequencies) for each of the 108 sessions, and
the Wilcoxon test is applied to the differences in these squared deviations across mod-
els. Table 2 is an updated version correcting SC’s pairwise model comparisons (compare
with their Table 3). The top-to-bottom order of the models is the same as in their orig-
inal table. The entries display rounded p-values for two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank tests for pairs of models, reported separately for constant-sum games, non-
constant-sum games, and for all games (exactly as in their Table 3).8 Combined, the
various statistical tests confirm the “no difference” result suggested by Figure 2 – there
is no clear ranking among the four non-Nash models that holds across all games. The no
difference result is all the more remarkable as the tests are based on 108 matched-pair
observations. As expected the non-Nash models all do much better than Nash, and it is
perhaps notable that action-sampling and payoff-sampling do better than QRE when all
games are combined.
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Figure 3. Overall Mean Squared Distances of the Five Stationary Concepts Compared to the
Observed Average (cf. SC Figure 12).
In their reply to this comment, Reinhard Selten, Thorsten Chmura and Sebastian J.
Goerg (henceforth, SCG) now suggest implicitly that the Wilcoxon test they used earlier
8Note that impulse-balance equilibrium does significantly better than payoff sampling and logit-QRE
for the non-constant-sum games, but it does significantly worse for the constant-sum games and worse
overall.
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Figure 4. Theory Specific Squared Distances of the Five Stationary Concepts Compared to
the Observed Average By Blocks of 100 Periods (cf. SC Figure 13).
is problematic because of the assumption of symmetry around the median (although
the assumption seems to be satisfied empirically9). SCG now propose using the Fisher-
Pitman test, which is newly reported in their reply (in press). The only difference in
the corrected Wilcoxon (W) results and the newly reported Fisher-Pitman (F-P) results
across all games is that action-sampling equilibrium is now only weakly more accurate
than QRE at p < 0.1 (F-P) rather than at p < 0.02 (W). In subsets of games, there
are some minor differences in the p-values at which differences are significant (p-values
generally are higher so results are weaker using the F-P test). QRE is significantly more
accurate than impulse balance in the constant-sum game subset (at p < 0.001 using
Wilcoxon), but using the F-P test, this result is erased, and impulse balance is also then
more accurate than QRE in the non-constant sum game subset (at p < 0.01).
To summarize, neither the Wilcoxon test originally applied by SC nor the weaker
Fisher-Pitman test differentiate very sharply among the stationary concepts. As noted
in the Introduction, an extension to games which do differentiate well across concepts
is therefore of interest in addressing the central point of the SC paper, which is the
comparison of stationary models.
9Ronald H. Randles, Michael A. Fligner, George E. Policello and Douglas A. Wolfe (1980) develop
a test for whether data are symmetrically distributed around an unknown median. We applied their
test to the matched pairs of squared deviations across all possible theory pairs and none of the resulting
p-values were at all close to significant (ranging from 0.32 to 0.89). So the assumption of symmetry is
reasonable and adds an additional empirical justification to SC’s initial use of the Wilcoxon test.
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Table 2—P-Values in Favor of Row Concepts, Two-Tailed Matched-Pairs Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test, n = 108 (Rounded to the Next Higher level Among 0.1 Percent, 0.2 Percent, 0.5
Percent, 1 Percent, 2 Percent, 5 Percent, and 10 Percent).
.
 
 
 
Above: All 108 Experiments; Middle: 72 Constant-Sum Game Experiments; Below: 36 
Non-Constant Sum Game Experiments. 
 
  
Impulse 
balance 
equilibrium 
Payoff-
sampling 
equilibrium
Action-
sampling 
equilibrium
Quantal 
response 
equilibrium 
Nash 
equilibrium
    0.1 percent
   0.1 percent
Impulse balance 
equilibrium 
  5 percent 0.5 percent 0.1 percent
n.s. 5 percent 0.1 percent
0.1 percent 0.1 percent 0.1 percent
Payoff-
sampling 
equilibrium  n.s. 0.1 percent
n.s. n.s. 2 percent 0.1 percent
5 percent n.s. 10 percent 0.1 percent
Action-
sampling 
equilibrium n.s. n.s. 10 percent 0.1 percent
n.s.  0.1 percent
0.1 percent  0.1 percent
Quantal 
response 
equilibrium   1 percent
II. Differentiating Stationary Concepts in Other Data Sets
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003) designed the game in the left panel of Figure 5 to
illustrate the limitations of QRE in terms of explaining behavior when other factors,
such as risk aversion, are likely to play a role. In particular, both players have a “safe”
choice that rewards either 160 or 200 and a “risky” choice that rewards either 10 or 370.
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003) prove that in any quantal response equilibrium (logit
or otherwise), the column player’s probability of playing Right is greater than 0.5. Risk
aversion, however, will naturally steer players towards the safer option of playing Left.
In the experiment, the aggregate choice frequencies were 65% for Left and 47% for
Up, which contradicts risk-neutral QRE predictions. To compute the impulse balance
equilibrium of the game, note that the max-min payoff is 160 for both players. Subtracting
160 from all payoffs and multiplying by 2 if the resulting number is negative, yields the
transformed game in the right panel of Figure 5. The condition that, for both players,
the expected impulses even out yields: 150 pD qR = 85 pU qL and 150 pU qR = 85 pD qL,
which implies that pU =
1
2 and qL =
30
47 ≈ 0.64. Impulse balance equilibrium fits almost
perfectly!
Keep in mind that in impulse balance equilibrium the response to perceived losses
(relative to the max-min reference point) is twice as large as the response to gains. The
authors are very clear that this asymmetry is a fixed feature of the theory, although in
principle it could be treated as a free parameter (as, e.g., Ockenfels and Selten, 2005,
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 Left Right   Left Right 
Up 200, 160 160, 10  Up 40, 0 0, -300 
Down 370, 200 10, 370  Down 210, 40 -300, 210 
       
 
Figure 5. A Matching Pennies Game with “Safe” (200/160) and “Risky” (370/10) choices (Left)
and the Transformed Game (Right).
did). Indeed, if losses and gains were weighed equally, the relevant conditions would
be: 150 pD qR = 170 pU qL and 150 pU qR = 170 pD qL, which implies that pU =
1
2 and
qL =
15
32 ≈ 0.47. In other words, without the crucial loss aversion feature, the impulse
balance equilibrium predictions are on the wrong side of 0.5 just like the risk-neutral
QRE predictions reported by Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003). The rightmost bars in
Figure 6 show the theory-specific mean-squared deviations for impulse balance, with and
without loss aversion. The other pairs of bars display the analogous results for Nash and
non-Nash models – the latter do better than impulse balance equilibrium once they are
also augmented with loss aversion (weighing losses twice as much as gains).10 Clearly,
it is the loss aversion assumption that drives the goodness of fit for this game across all
theories. It is true that only impulse balance equilibrium has loss aversion hardwired
into it (Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink and Ricarda Cox, 2005), but Figure 6 shows that
adding loss aversion to the other theories (using the fixed value of two for the loss aversion
parameter) improves fit dramatically.
A. Asymmetric Matching Pennies Games
A second test of the stationary concepts is provided by the experiments of McKelvey,
Palfrey and Weber (2000) based on games with an “asymmetric matching pennies” struc-
ture (Ochs, 1995), see Figure 7. The Row player earns a positive amount if the players
match on “Heads” or “Tails” (and then the Column player earns nothing), or the Col-
umn player earns a positive amount if the players mismatch (and the Row player earns
nothing). McKelvey, Palfrey and Weber (2000) consider four related games: in game A,
X = 9; in game D, X = 4; game B payoffs are the same as game A’s except Column
payoffs are multiplied by 4; game C payoffs are the same as game A’s except all payoffs
are multiplied by 4.
To compute the impulse balance equilibria for these games note that the max-min
payoff is 0 for both players (as it is the second-lowest payoff) so the transformed games
are equivalent to the original games. In other words, loss aversion plays no role in these
games, which makes them ideal to further test the different stationary concepts.
A simple calculation shows that for the game in Figure 7, the impulse balance equilib-
rium predictions for the Row and Column players are11
10The model estimates without loss aversion are: n = 1 for action sampling, n = 1 for payoff sampling,
and λ = 0 for logit-QRE. The logit-QRE estimate shows that the model cannot by itself explain behavior
in the game of Figure 5, which was the main motivation for its design. With loss aversion the estimates
are: n = 4 for action sampling, n = 4 for payoff sampling, and λ = 0.024 for logit-QRE.
11The impulse balance equations are X(1− p)q = p(1− q) for the Row player and pq = (1− p)(1− q)
for the Column player.
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Figure 6. Theory-specific Mean-Squared Distances for Game 4 from Goeree, Holt and Palfrey
(2003) for Models with and without Loss Aversion.
(1) pH =
√
X
1 +
√
X
, qH =
1
1 +
√
X
.
Since multiplicative factors drop out of the impulse balance equilibrium calculations,
the predictions for games A, B, and C are identical: pH = 0.75 for Row and qH = 0.25
for Column, while for game D we have pH = 0.67 for Row and qH = 0.33 for Column.
The aggregate choice frequencies observed in the experiments are shown in Table 3
together with the predictions of the five stationary concepts (estimating any free param-
eters across all four games, with best-fitting parameters shown at the top of Table 3).12
The rightmost column reports the number of sessions of each game.13 Using a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test to evaluate differences in MSD across McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber’s
sessions (number of observations shown in the rightmost column of Table 3) shows that all
non-Nash models are significantly more accurate than Nash (at the 1% level), the action-
sampling and payoff-sampling models are more accurate than QRE and impulse balance
equilibrium (at the 2% level), and impulse balance equilibrium appears to have a non-
negligible advantage over QRE, but it does not reach conventional levels of significance
in this data set.
12Recall that the games considered by McKelvey, Palfrey and Weber (2000) are such that loss aversion
plays no role so all models are estimated without loss aversion.
13In the McKelvey, Palfrey and Weber (2000) experiments, subjects played 50 periods using one of
their game forms and then played another 50 periods using another one of their game forms. In the
analysis reported here, we consider only the first 50 periods of play.
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 Heads Tails 
Heads X, 0 0, 1 
Tails 0, 1 1, 0 
   
 
Figure 7. An Asymmetric Matching Pennies Game.
III. Conclusion
This comment corrects and re-examines some of the results reported by SC. Correcting
for errors in estimating two of the five stationary concepts they consider, QRE and
action-sampling equilibrium, it appears that their design does not differentiate among
the non-Nash stationary concepts that were considered. They also suggest it is desirable
to create games which discriminate among these non-Nash theories, a direction which we
pursue by reporting two new analyses. We first tested these concepts further by using
data from previous laboratory experiments on a game constructed to show that QRE can
predict poorly. Applying all five stationary concepts to those data, with and without loss-
aversion, shows that the loss-aversion that is a fixed feature of impulse balance equilibrium
is crucial for its explanatory power in this particular game. This result extends our
understanding of which modeling features of various theories are responsible for accurate
fit. We also tested the stationary concepts on four variants of matching pennies games.
In these games, all theories fit much better than Nash but action-sampling and payoff-
sampling fit a little better than the other non-Nash theories.
Table 3—Five Stationary Concepts Together with the Observed Relative Frequencies for
Each of the Experimental Games in McKelvey, Palfrey and Weber (2000) where Loss Aversion
Plays no Role (All Models Are Estimated Without Loss Aversion).
 Game   Nash 
QRE 
(λ=3.62) 
Action-
sampling 
(n=3) 
Payoff-
sampling 
(n=3) 
Impulse 
Balance
Observed 
average 
Number of 
Observations 
A U 0.500 0.760 0.643 0.625 0.750 0.648 3 
 L 0.100 0.132 0.291 0.276 0.250 0.245  
B U 0.500 0.573 0.643 0.625 0.750 0.627 2 
 L 0.100 0.108 0.291 0.276 0.250 0.300  
C U 0.500 0.575 0.643 0.625 0.750 0.608 2 
 L 0.100 0.102 0.291 0.276 0.250 0.218  
D U 0.500 0.661 0.643 0.625 0.667 0.643 1 
 L 0.200 0.237 0.291 0.276 0.333 0.343  
MSD   0.0441 0.0256 0.0057 0.0054 0.0153     
 
One distinguishing element of impulse balance equilibrium vis-a`-vis the other non-Nash
models is that it is “parameter free,” since the loss-aversion coefficient is calibrated to 2.
This can be a desirable feature from a theoretical viewpoint but makes the model less
suitable for empirical applications. Ockenfels and Selten (2005), for example, introduce
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weighted impulse balance equilibrium to allow for a general ratio, γ, that measures the
importance of upward and downward impulses in first-price auctions. They estimate that
γ = 3, i.e. upward impulses that occur when the auction is lost are roughly three times
larger than downward impulses that occur when the winner of the auction “left money
on the table.” As Ockenfels and Selten (2005, p. 166) argue, “...there is no reason to
assume that γ cannot change with experiment design parameters...” Indeed, a survey of
studies that estimate loss aversion coefficients from lab or field data shows that γ varies
(from 1.5 to 4.5) across games, contexts, and subject pools, see Colin F. Camerer (2009).
Allowing for a one-parameter extension of the basic impulse balance model to improve
empirical applicability is closely related to the introduction of the precision parameter in
QRE and to sample size parameters in action- and payoff-sampling theories. Comparing
these models with Nash equilibrium, and impulse balance with a weight of two, raises
interesting questions about the advantages and disadvantages of parametric approaches.
Certainly, both parametric and parameter-free approaches should be explored, but our
view of parametric models of behavior in games is more optimistic than the view articu-
lated by SCG in their reply to this comment. They state that “non-parametric concepts
like the IBE [impulse balance equilibrium] have the advantage that they can serve as the
basis of theoretical investigations just like NE [Nash equilibrium].” Of course, parametric
models can also be investigated theoretically, and have been, many times. Indeed, many
comparative static predictions from a wide range of models in all areas of economics are
of this sort; they report how behavior should respond to parameter changes (e.g. how
behavior varies with a risk-aversion or time-preference parameter). To be sure, those
theoretical results will typically depend on specific parameter values, but they are theo-
retical results nonetheless. SCG also assert that “...reliable predictions are not possible
in face of wide variation of parameter estimates for different data sets.” It is surely too
pessimistic to declare such prediction “not possible.” Making accurate new predictions
is quite possible if parameter variation is not very wide, or if theory can eventually be
developed to explain why parameters vary across games. In fact, if parameter varia-
tion reflects some fundamental aspect of players’ cognition, such as experience, analytical
skill, attentiveness, or memory, then parameters should vary across games. Then the
only question is how reported estimates can be used to create good theory about how
parameters vary, turning that variation from an inevitable bug into a valuable feature.
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